Aerial manoeuvres in the South China Sea

14:21 18/6/2021 - Πηγή: Armynow

A recent aerial encounter over the South China Sea between military aircraft from China and Malaysia is potentially significant on a number of fronts, explains Euan Graham. Could it serve as a portent of a more assertive Chinese military air posture

over the South China Sea?

By Euan Graham*

According to a 1 June statement by the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF), on 31 May, a formation of 16 transport aircraft from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was monitored as it approached the coastline of Sarawak, in east Malaysia, first passing through the Flight Information Region (FIR) administered by Singapore, then that of Malaysia. After radio communications failed to elicit a response, a pair of RMAF Hawk light combat aircraft were sent to identify and intercept the Chinese aircraft. After making visual contact, the PLAAF formation turned back north, passing within 60 nautical miles (nm) of Malaysia.

The RMAF statement protested the formation flight as a ‘serious matter that threatens national security and aviation safety’. Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein, who hitherto held the defence portfolio and has attracted occasional criticism for his deferential behaviour towards Beijing went a step further, describing China’s actions as a ‘breach of the Malaysian airspace and sovereignty’.

Credit: Royal Malaysian Air Force

China’s foreign ministry countered that the PLAAF was conducting ‘routine flight training’ and exercising ‘freedom of overflight in the relevant airspace’. This position is interesting, to say the least, given Beijing’s trenchant opposition to US military surveillance flights that are routinely conducted within China’s vicinity, beyond its national airspace. China’s aerial manoeuvre was legal, under international law, irrespective of Malaysia’s claims that its sovereignty was violated. Malaysia has long claimed the right to restrict military activities within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). But international law is clear that national air space extends as far as the 12nm territorial sea and no further. The 200nm EEZ is irrelevant with regard to rights of overflight, including military aircraft. Similarly, FIRs and air-defence identification zones are purely administrative and carry no jurisdictional weight.

Malaysia’s authorities are on more solid ground when it comes to their complaint that the PLAAF pilots deviated from normal practice by not responding to radio challenges. This detail could be significant to divining China’s motivations. A squadron-sized formation of military transports is highly unusual and would be easy to detect, even by civilian air traffic control. A signalling intention at some level, therefore, seems plausible. By automatically transponding their position but not responding to radio challenges, the PLAAF aircraft apparently wanted to be seen, but by maintaining their silence were signalling that the exercise was non-permissive. A large airlift exercise is arguably a less belligerent signal than a formation of bombers, but it is still coercive in nature.

Divining intentions

One possibility is that this was a move designed to ward off Malaysia from exploiting new offshore energy resources. Last year, maritime tensions ran high after Malaysia’s Petronas undertook energy exploration activity off Sarawak, prompting China to bring in its own survey vessel, coast guard and warships. Kuala Lumpur has generally adopted a non-confrontational stance with Beijing, despite China’s steady encroachment in the South China Sea. But offshore energy provides a major source of federal government revenue, and Kuala Lumpur takes its protection seriously. Thus far, Malaysia has resisted Chinese pressure to enter into joint development on the basis that it enjoys exclusive rights over seabed resources within its EEZ and continental shelf, regardless of being overlapped by China’s thoroughly discredited nine-dash line claim. The Malaysian government is understood to have recently approved a new energy project in the Kasawari gas field, expected to produce up to 900 million cubic feet of gas per day. The PLAAF overflight could have been intended to serve as a geopolitical warning not to proceed.

It is also possible that this was a training exercise intended as a demonstration of tactical airlift capability. According to one estimate, a formation of 16 transport aircraft would be enough to airlift a combined arms battalion. It seems reasonable to conclude that any such demonstration would be aimed more widely than Malaysia. It was recently suggested that the PLAAF could be redirecting some of its operational efforts from the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea.

A further possibility, not exclusive of the others, is that the PLAAF was probing Malaysia’s air-defence response capabilities, and perhaps putting Kuala Lumpur’s political willingness to intercept the Chinese aircraft to the test. From this standpoint, the selection of unarmed transport aircraft is almost contemptuous for what it says about China’s anticipation of the Malaysian response. A concern that the RMAF lacks the necessary air-defence capabilities to deal with such incidents could be what motivated the air force to take the unusual step of issuing a statement. Intriguingly, the statement said that ‘the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been informed about this matter through the Ministry of Defence’, a hint that the incident has stressed Malaysia’s civil–military fault-lines.

Implications

Malaysia’s insistence that its sovereignty was transgressed is unhelpful from the viewpoint of its major defence partners and surrounding states, since it backs a restrictive interpretation of overflight at odds with international law and relevant aviation conventions. Ironically, China’s claim that it was exercising overflight in conformity with international law has more ‘upside’, since it exposes Beijing to the charge of double standards closer to home.

Whether the incident will motivate Malaysia to take a more robust stance in the South China Sea or commit more resources to defence modernisation is debatable. This week’s announcement in Chongqing that ASEAN and China have agreed to seek an early agreement on the South China Sea Code of Conduct could augur for a more positive diplomatic phase ahead. But the fact remains that China’s foreign ministry does not call the shots in South China Sea policy.

The more concerning precedent is the PLA’s resort to air power as a coercive tool at both ends of the South China Sea. Aerial encounters involve far less warning than manoeuvres at sea, compressing crisis decision times. Malaysia may be a less risky proposition to China for such intimidatory displays than, say, Vietnam. But other Southeast Asian states should probably brace themselves for similar tactics. In this vein, it is timely that the Philippine Air Force recently announced its decision to procure Gripen fighters from Sweden, promising a much-improved air-defence capability in future. Malaysia, unfortunately, has no successor in the pipeline to replace its Sukhoi Su-30MKM and F/A-18 interceptors. Its Hawks are better than nothing, but no match for the PLAAF.

*Euan Graham is one of two senior fellows based in Singapore supporting the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Fullerton Forum and other activities run by IISS–Asia. He is also responsible for furthering research within the IISS on defence and security in northeast Asia and the western Pacific.

Source: iiss.org

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